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Framing the 2011 England riots: Understanding the political and policy response 
 
Tim Newburn, Trevor Jones and Jarrett Blaustein 
 
 
1. The English Riots 
Two days after the fatal shooting of a mixed-race, 25-year old man, Mark Duggan, by 
Metropolitan Police officers in north London, a peaceful protest outside Tottenham police 
station ended with the outbreak of violence and became the starting point of what was to 
be four days of rioting. The initial disorder in Tottenham spread across London, eventually 
affecting 21 of the 32 London boroughs, and subsequently a number of cities including 
Birmingham, Manchester, Salford and Liverpool (Guardian/LSE, 2011). Over the course of 
the four days, five people lost their lives, hundreds were injured and estimates of the 
damage caused reached over half a billion pounds (RCVP, 2012). The riots of 2011 can lay 
claim to be the most serious civil disorder in England since the 1980s and quite possibly in 
the whole post-war period. Those involved tended to be drawn from the poorer urban 
communities and were relatively ethnically diverse, thus differing somewhat from both the 
riots of the 1980s and much disorder since (xxx, 2015). They gave rise to a huge amount of 
academic commentary and research (see, for example, xxx et al, 2015; xxx et al, 2016; Stott 
et al, 2016), focusing in the main on the antecedents of the riots and then, more particularly, 
on how the riots should be interpreted and understood.  
 
Although there is much that can be said in comparing the England riots in 2011 with earlier 
outbreaks of disorder (xxx, 2015) or with rioting in mainland Europe in recent times (xxx, 
2016), this paper has a different focus. Rather than considering the causes of the riots, its 
concern is with the political and policy response to these events, something as yet 
unconsidered in academic treatment of the 2011 disorder. How should the reaction of 
British political leaders, and the policy response in the aftermath of the disorder, be 
characterised and understood? To do this we begin by examining the main political 
narratives that emerged during the riots. These were identified in three main ways: first, 
through a reading of all major parliamentary debates regarding the riots in the year from the 
first night of disorder onward, an analysis of newspaper reporting of the riots and their 
aftermath in 2011 using the Lexis/Nexis database; and, finally, through a reading of the main 
policy documents and statements produced by government where there was any explicit 
link made to the riots. This analysis identified four primary narratives in the governmental 
reading of the riots, focusing on: the i i al  eha iour of those involved in the disorder; 
the role of problem families; the involvement of gangs; and, the role and conduct of the 
police service during the riots. 
 
What were the functions of these narratives? We will suggest that in this case, at heart, they 
were defensive, seeking to delegitimize any claims that underlying structural socio-economic 
factors might have played some part in the riots, whilst also resisting any suggestion that 
budget cuts were in any way responsible for the limited policing response to initial nights of 
disorder. The focus on criminality in particular served as the basis for refusing demands for  
a major public inquiry. More generally, however, we want to argue that three of the f a es  
through which the riots were understood – gangs, policing and problem families - continued 
to have influence long after the violence had ended, not least in shaping elements of the 
scale and nature of policy response – or, arguably more accurately, the lack of response - to 
the disorder. For what at the time seemed to be potentially seismic events, viewed from a 
longer perspective, the 2011 English riots had remarkably little actual impact in terms of 
substantive deviations from the trajectory of government policies in policing, criminal justice 
o  oade  elfa e efo  poli . Most sig ifi a t of all, the Coalitio  go e e t s 
landmark austerity programme was to continue unabated for the rest of its term. This lack 
of longer term impact was in no small part down to a highly successful deployment of 
narrative frames in the immediate aftermath of the events of summer 2011, and the relative 
failure of non-governmental frames to impinge on the policy process.   
 
2. Riots and Interpretive Policy Analysis 
In thinking about the political and policy response to the riots we draw on the framework of 
Joh  Ki gdo s  ultiple st ea s app oa h M“A  to u de sta di g the pu li  poli  
process. Initially developed in the late 1970s/early 1980s the MSA has become a key 
reference point in the public policy literature and has been applied widely in a range of 
different national and local contexts, and policy spheres (Cairney and Jones 2016). In short,  
Kingdon (1995) argues that public policy-making comprises a set of processes including (at a 
minimum) agenda-setting, alternative-specification, authoritative choice and 
implementation. However, rather than proceeding in set of neat sequential stages, and 
adapting the well-esta lished ga age a  odel (Cohen et al, 1972), Kingdon proposes 
that the e a e th ee disti t p o ess st ea s  ithi  the s ste , each operating according 
to thei  o  d a i s a d ules. These a e the p o le  st ea  the process of generation 
of p o le s  e ui i g atte tio   poli - ake s , the poli  st ea  the ge e atio  of 
poli  ideas a d p oposals , a d fi all , the politi al st ea  the out o e of ele tio s, 
de elop e ts i  the pu li  ood , interest group campaigning and so forth. 
 
The populatio  of pote tial p o le s  fo  poli -makers is infinite, and in the context of 
atte tio  shifti g apidl  f o  issue to issue, o l  a s all f a tio  of pote tial p o le s  ill 
ever come to the attention of policy-makers. Kingdon identifies a number of ways in which 
p o le s  o e to the atte tio  of poli - ake s i ludi g i di ato s  e ide e a out the 
e iste e a d size of a p o le  a d the s ope fo  ha ge , fo usi g e e ts  that d a  
attention to specific features of problems), and feedback (from previous policy 
p og a es . Poli  solutio s e ist i  hat Ki gdo  des i es as a poli  p i e al soup , 
evolving gradually as they are pushed forward by some policy actors, and are considered 
and modified by othe  pa ti ipa ts i  poli  et o ks i  a p o ess of softe i g  up.    
 
From time to time, developments in the political stream or the emergence of particularly 
compelling problems, lead to the opening of poli  i do s  i.e. opportunities for 
promoting certain proposals or conceptions of a problem). Such windows provide 
opportunities fo  poli  e t ep e eu s  illi g to invest their resources – time, energy, 
reputation, and sometimes money – i  the hope of futu e etu  : . Significant 
policy change thus comes about when policy actors take effective advantage of the policy 
windows within which the three streams converge he e  solutio s e o e joi ed to 
problems, and both of them are joined to favourable political forces (1995: 20). The flipside 
of this of course, is that effective policy change can be resisted by swift action by policy 
actors to close the policy windows that arise  
 
Ki gdo s approach has been influential not least because it usefully identifies a number of 
u i e sal  featu es of the public policy process. These include its essential ambiguity (the 
many ways of framing a policy problem), competition for attention (in that only a few 
problems reach the top of the agenda), imperfect selection (lack of reliable information), 
time limitations for decision-makers, and the lack of comprehensive rationality and/or 
linearity to the policy process (Cairney, 2013). As we have observed previously (xxx, 2007; 
xxx, 2017) all too often criminological research, when discussing policy, has tended to focus 
on policy outcomes and to pay much less attention to the ways policies emerge and 
develop. Interpretive inquiry, by contrast, tends to the ie  that p o le  state e ts a e 
contending interpretations of policy issues made by different communities of ea i g  
(Yanow, 1999). Borrowing from the social movements literature we see framing processes as 
strategic attempts to craft, disseminate, and contest the language and narratives used to 
des i e  pa ti ula  politi al a d poli  p o le s Kell  Garrett, 2006). Part of the focus then 
becomes ho  a e poli  issues f a ed  and what is the consequence of such framing? Of 
course, the idea that strategic framing of narratives by elite groups can shape longer term 
penal policy trajectories is not new. Wea e s a al sis of the deeper political roots of the 
punitive shift in late twentieth century US penal policies outlines ho  a f o tlash  of 
proactive policy framing by defeated  conservative elites in 1960s civil rights debates 
effectively shifted the locus of attack  by injecting crime onto the agenda  : . 
Thus, the focus of debate shifted away from racial inequality and social reform and towards 
crime and punishment, with long term consequences that are still playing out today in the 
USA. The focus of the current paper is somewhat different, with its narrower temporal focus 
on a single particular set of focusing events and related policy windows, and, crucially, the 
ways in which strategic framing of problems neutralized rather than stimulated policy 
change. Nevertheless, the importance of f a i g  of issues i  this a  – whether to 
promote or in effect to block policy change -  is clear.  
 
As Yanow (1999) observes, the use and existence of different frames is not simply a question 
of varying understandings and perceptions, as well as alternative possible courses of action, 
ut is also likel  to sig if  the e iste e of diffe e t alues. As a o se ue e, the ole of 
the i te p eti e poli  a al st is to ap the a hite tu e  of de ate elative to the policy 
issue u de  i estigatio  : . In this spirit, our approach here is to consider some of 
the key f a es  th ough hi h the 2011 riots were understood in order to explore the 
beliefs, values or meanings that each implied or expressed. In using this terminology we are 
o o i g f o  “ o  a d Be fo d s  o k o  pa ti ipa t o ilizatio  i  so ial 
movements. In that context they argued that there were three core framing tasks: first, a 
diagnostic element identifying something problematic; second, a prognostic proposal for a 
solution to the identified problem; and third, a rationale for engaging in such action. Our 
argument here though, is that the nature of the diagnosis is a crucial influence upon any 
prognostic proposals that subsequently emerge and may also serve as the core rationale for 
such proposals. That is to say, we want to argue that the early and repeated deployment of 
particular portrayals of the riots and those involved served to help define how the disorder 
was discussed and understood. They also came to act as political lenses which served to 
influence both the scale and the nature of the public policy responses to the disorder, or to 
justify it, reflecting, the fact that eliefs a d p a ti es a e o stituti e of ea h othe  Be i  
and Rhodes, 2007: 2). Although we take the view that public policy development is 
contingent – it is neither fixed nor determined by policy beliefs and pronouncements – we 
will nevertheless argue that initial policy narratives had an important influence on the 
development of later policy initiatives or, rather their absence. As Reich (1988: 5) observed, 
it is st iki g ho  u h the i itial defi itio  of p o le s a d hoi es i flue es the 
su se ue t desig  a d e e utio  of pu li  poli ies . I  Ki gdo s (1995) terms, we take this 
i itial stage of age da setti g  to i ol e a o e o  less o s ious p o ess of deli iti g the 
a ge of a aila le alte ati es  fo  poli  de elop e t.    
 
The study and interpretation of policy development over time also requires, we would 
argue, the use of elements of policy narrative analysis. Policy narratives, in this regard, are 
those stories – scenarios and arguments – that are taken by one or more parties to the 
controversy as underwriting (that is, establishing or certifying) and stabilizing (that is, fixing 
o  aki g stead  the assu ptio s fo  poli aki g i  the fa e of the issue s u e tai t , 
o ple it  o  pola izatio  (Roe, 1994: 3). The first question in relation to the riots, 
therefore, is what were the key narratives? As is inevitably the case in connection with civil 
disorder, the interpretation and understanding of the events – certainly initially – is itself the 
subject of contention. For government, the police, and the communities involved there were 
concerted attempts to portray the riots, and themselves, in particular ways. It is to these 
differing narratives that we turn our attention next.    
 
 
3. Political and Public Reaction to the Riots 
I  at least o e i po ta t espe t, the politi s st ea  at the ti e of the iots as u usual, 
for the UK General Election of 2010 had produced no clear result and a Coalition 
government had been returned for the first time in the post-war period. After a short 
honeymoon period, tensions between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat elements in 
the coalition began to emerge, and although the Liberal Democrats had a larger number of 
ministerial portfolios than their size might have warranted, all the major spending 
departments, including the Home Office and Ministry of Justice, were in the hands of 
Conservative ministers. Negotiations in the aftermath of the election resulted in a shared 
policy programme, but this required significant concessions on both sides, not least the 
abandonment of a Liberal Democrat manifesto pledge not to raise university tuition fees. 
The political and policy response to the riots of 2011, therefore, must be understood partly 
against this backdrop of coalition politics, and in the broader context of the very 
considerable political, economic and ideological uncertainty of the period (Taylor Gooby and 
Stoker, 2012). The emergent coalition programme was one of enormous public spending 
cuts and sizeable tax increases, together with plans for substantial public sector reform.   
 
The riots themselves occurred in early August when parliament was not in session and the 
vast majority of senior political figures were on holiday. As a consequence, many politicians 
were slow out of the blocks when it came to comment on the riots. On the morning after the 
fi st ight s ioti g, the e as a state e t f o  Do i g st eet o de i g the diso de  as 
utte l  u a epta le , sa i g that the e as a poli e i estigatio  u de a  a d e should 
let that p o ess happe .1 The statement was made by a government spokesperson as there 
were no senior ministers present at the time. Indeed, the absence of the Prime Minister – he 
returned from his holiday in Italy on Monday 8th August on the third night of rioting – and 
other senior political figures in the early days of the disorder drew considerable criticism 
and, it is probably fair to speculate, played some part in their desire to be seen to be taking 
control when eventually they did become involved.  
 
The riots were, by most standards, a huge political moment. The  e e, i  Ki gdo s  
te s, a ajo  fo usi g e e t  – so ethi g that d a s atte tio  to so e o ditio s o e 
tha  to othe s  : . From the Monday onward, for approximately a week, there was, 
as we have suggested, a concerted attempt to establish four major narratives about the 
riots. These were: first, that the behaviour of those involved was first and foremost to be 
understood as criminality, rather than as a product of poverty or social exclusion; second, 
such behaviour was indicative of a moral breakdown and one that had its roots in 
dysfunctional families and inadequate parenting; third, the criminal conduct of the rioters 
was linked to long-established urban gangs; and, finally, that inadequate policing – both in 
terms of the nature and the scale of the response – had contributed significantly to the rapid 
spread of the rioting.2 We take each of these briefly in turn.    
 
Cri i ality Pure a d Si ple  
It is a standard political response to rioting to seek to have those involved identified as 
so eho  othe . As those involved in disorder are often critical of government, or of 
government policy – irrespective of whether this is an explicit focus on their anger or protest 
– it is of little surprise that governments and political spokespeople often respond 
defensively. Riotous assemblies are presented as irrational mobs or simply as groups with 
nothing more than criminal intent, rather than as collections of people with some form of 
grievance (Skolnick, 1969). As President George H.W. Bush said of the riots that broke out 
after the acquittal of the police officers accused of beating Rodney King:  
 
What we saw last night and the night before in Los Angeles is not about civil rights. 
It s ot a out the g eat ause of e ualit  that all A e i a s ust uphold. It s ot a 
essage of p otest. It s ee  the utalit  of the o , pu e a d si ple. A d let e 
assure you: I will use whatever force is necessary to restore order. What is going on 
in L.A. must and will stop. [quoted in Camp (2016) at p. 98] 
 
Such responses come in two primary forms. First, it is quite usual to find commentators 
arguing that the rioting was started, or at least exacerbated, by outside troublemakers of 
                                                 
1 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/blog/2011/aug/07/tottenham-riots-police-duggan-live (accessed 
5th March 2017) 
2 We are not of course suggesting that these were the only narratives.  
one sort or another. In the 1967 Detroit riot for example, it was regularly argued that it was 
people new to the community, who had only recently arrived in Detroit who were primarily 
responsible for the violence. Research later showed this to be false (Fine, 2007). In a wide 
range of examples, from the 1980s urban riots in England (Scarman, 1981) to Ferguson, 
Missouri in 20143, it has typically been suggested that people from outside those respective 
communities had deliberately travelled in order to instigate or take advantage of the 
violence.  The 2011 England riots were no exception.4 In such accounts, the riots become the 
o k of p ofessio al i i als , oppo tu ists  a d op ats , the i pli atio  ei g that 
there is no link with local neighbourhoods and, more especially, with lo al espe ta le  
citizens. The motives are simply greed and gain and, consequently, any claim to any other 
rationale is undermined and any legitimacy removed. The second, and linked political 
reaction is, irrespective of where rioters may originate, simply to describe them as 
i i als , thugs  o  thie es  and to see the rioting straightforwardly through the lens of 
criminal conduct. Again, the overall political intention is the same. It was this second 
strategy that was voiced most strongly during the 2011 riots and in their aftermath. In his 
first speech after the rioting had broken out, David Cameron made a statement in Downing 
Street in which he said: 
 
Let me, first of all, completely condemn the scenes that we have seen on our 
television screens and people have witnessed in their communities. These are 
sickening scenes – scenes of people looting, vandalizing, thieving, robbing, scenes of 
people atta ki g poli e offi e s a d e e  atta ki g fi e e s as the e t i g to put 
out fires. This is criminality, pure and simple, and it has to be confronted and 
defeated.5 
 
He des i ed the go e e t as ei g o  the side of the la -a idi g , a d that people 
should e pe t to see a  o e a ests i  the da s to o e  tha  the  that had al ead  
take  pla e. To those espo si le fo  this o gdoi g a d i i alit  he said ou ill feel 
the full force of the law and if you are old enough to commit these crimes you are old 
e ough to fa e pu ish e t . Cou t p o edu es a d p o esses ould e speeded up he 
promised. Echoing this rhetoric, the Home Secreta  said The diso de  this su e  as t 
about poverty or politics. It was about greed and criminality, fuelled by a culture of 
i espo si ilit  a d e title e t. 6 Even the Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister, Nick 
Clegg, recommended that those convicted of looting should be made to dress in orange 
                                                 
3 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/19/ferguson-outsiders-protesters-riots-peaceful-
unrest (accessed 11th March 2017) 
4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8713298/London-riots-were-orchestrated-by-
outsiders.html (accessed 11th March 2017) 
5 Daily Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8691034/London-riots-Prime-
Ministers-statement-in-full.html emphasis added (accessed 5th March 2017). In fact, it seems the 
Prime Minister may have lifted this phrase straight from the Daily Mail. In its editorial published 
earlier that day, the Mail opi ed: To blame the cuts is immoral and cynical. This is criminality – pure 
and simple – by yobs who have nothing but contempt for decent, law-a idi g people.  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2023967/London-riots-No-excuses-wanton-
criminality.html#ixzz4avJEAEtg (accessed 10th March 2017) 
6 http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2011/10/04/theresa-may-speech-in-full (accessed 
12th February 2018) 
jump suits so as to be publicly visible when they were subsequently forced to clean up local 
communities as part of their punishment.7 As we say, such statements are, in many respects, 
fairly standard governmental responses to rioting, as well as being a well-established 
conservative narrative in relation to crime in general. The poli  p o le  i  Ki gdo s 
te s elates to i di idual i ked ess a d the solutio  a st aightfo a d atte  of o e 
robust control via the criminal justice and penal systems. The key questions are how 
do i a t does su h a a ati e e o e, a d hat othe  f a es  fo  u de sta di g the 
riots become available? More particularly, and we return to this below, to what extent was 
government willing to accept the possibility, as the Home Secretary said of the 1981 Brixton 
iot, that it a  have deep- ooted a d fu da e tal auses  a d o es e ui i g the most 
tho ough e a i atio  (Hansard, HC debs, 13th April 1981, col. 21). Alternative framings of 
the poli  p o le s  that u de la  the iots came from a variety of sources, not least by the 
Guardian/LSE (2011) study that attempted to inject research-based evidence into the 
fevered political debates that followed the riots. This was a unique study in terms of its 
nature as a collaboration between a leading university and national newspaper, and the 
rapidity with which the study was designed and conducted with a key aim of influencing the 
policy debates in the immediate aftermath of the disorder. The first phase of the study, 
involving 270 interviews with people who participated in the riots, took place in the three 
months following the riots and was published in December 2011 (xxx, 2011). The findings 
provided very different (and more complex) framings of the policy problems behind the 
riots, emphasizing toxic police-community relations in deprived inner city areas, simmering 
resentment amongst young people about cuts to youth services and increases in student 
tuition fees, and the ongoing problems of poverty and social disadvantage being 
e a e ated  s i gei g pu li  e pe ditu e uts. Whilst these alte ati e f a i gs  
received considerable attention in the broadcast and print media, perhaps predictably, 
much of the coverage was hostile, with sections of the conservative press denouncing 
a ade i  apologists  fo  the iote s Daily Mail 9th December 2011)8 in terms that were 
quickly echoed by leading politicians, not least the Home Secretary (see below). Although 
the findings of the Guardian/LSE study were arguably to have some influence later on, it 
might be suggested that quick though its response was, in the main it was still insufficient to 
challenge the framings that had been established in the days immediately following the 
events.  
 
Families and parenting 
Just less than a week after the last of the rioting the Prime Minister gave his most wide-
ranging speech to date. He said it as ti e fo  the ou t  to take sto k .9 He praised those 
i ol ed i  the lea  up  ope atio , s pathized with those whose homes and businesses 
had been destroyed, and then turned his attention to why the riots had occurred. He 
                                                 
7 “a  so  to ou  i ti s a d lea -up i  a  o a ge ju p suit : Clegg p o ises pa a k fo  ioters, 
Daily Mail, 16th August 2011 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2026553/Nick-Clegg-promises-
pay-UK-rioters-Say-sorry-victims-clean-up.html (accessed 1st February 2018) 
8 www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2072228/Apologists-mob.html 
9 PM s spee h o  the fight a k afte  the iots, th August 2011, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-on-the-fightback-after-the-riots (accessed 
10th March 2017)  
eite ated his se se that u h of it as just pu e i i alit , ut also a k o ledged that, 
i  Totte ha  at least, so e of the a ge  as di e ted at the poli e . As the p o esses of 
inquiry began to get underway he said it was clear that these riots were not about race or 
po e t  o  go e e t uts ut, athe , e e si pl  people sho i g i diffe e e to ight 
and wrong; people with a twisted moral code; people with a complete absence of self-
est ai t . In fact, his diagnosis was that this was a behavioural and moral problem, allowing 
him to li k the iots to his B oke  B itai  age da (Hayton, 2012). 
 
I  the P i e Mi iste s ie , if the e as to e a  hope of e di g ou  oke  so iet , 
fa il  a d pa e ti g is he e e e got to sta t . Whilst so e of this o k ould ha e to 
fo us o  pa e ti g ge e all , he said that u ge t a tio  as eeded to deal ith t ou led  
o  p o le  fa ilies: the o es that e e o e i  thei  eigh ou hood k o s a d ofte  
a oids . He said that a tio  had ee  i  t ai  p io  to the iots ut had ee  held a k  
u eau a . No  that the iots had o u ed it as ti e to lea  a a  the ed tape a d 
u eau ati  a gli g, a d put o ket ooste s u de  this p og a e … ith a lea  
ambition that within the lifetime of this Parliament we will turn around the lives of the 
,  ost t ou led fa ilies i  the ou t . Mu h of the e ai de  of the PM s speech 
in the week after the riots offered little new and in the main simply offered up a number of 
existing policy proposals or programmes as potential solutions to the problems highlighted 
by the riots. Free schools and academies were praised as the best means of improving 
education in poor areas; executive mayors, training for community organisers and changes 
to planning rules were highlighted as the most effective means of inculcating respect for 
local communities; and, welfare reforms were promoted as encouraging greater 
espo si ilit  a d uildi g a  o e ship i  hi h e e o e feels the  ha e a stake .10 
 
A gang culture  
The riots caught a lot of politicians by surprise. The shooting on August 6th had not resulted 
in any immediate disorder, and it was only two days later, after problems arose in 
connection with the protest outside Tottenham police station, that violence broke out. 
Parliament was eventually recalled for an emergency debate and in the House, the Prime 
Minister made a wide-ranging speech i  hi h he epeated his i i alit  pu e a d si ple  
formula and went on to intimate that any suggested link between the Duggan shooting and 
the looti g i  Totte ha  a d espe iall  pla es outside Totte ha  as p eposte ous  
(Hansard, HC debs, 11 August 2011, col. 1051). He was critical of the police – a matter we will 
come to shortly – and then turned his attention to problems such as new social media and, 
crucially, gangs. At the hea t of all the iole e sits the issue of st eet ga gs , he said, 
te ritorial, hierarchical and incredibly violent, they are mostly composed of young boys, 
ai l  f o  d sfu tio al ho es  (Hansard, HC debs, 11 August 2011, col. 1054). Announcing a 
a  o  ga gs , he said that he had asked the Home Secretary, together with other members 
of the cabinet, to work on a cross-government programme of action to deal with gang 
culture, and to report within two months. This met with support from the Leader of the 
Opposition who agreed that a sustained effort to tackle the urban gang problem was 
                                                 
10 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-on-the-fightback-after-the-riots  
required. The same day, in her speech in response to the riots, the then Home Secretary, 
Theresa May, further reinforced the message saying: 
 
But nobody doubts that the violence we have seen over the last five days is the 
symptom of something ve  deepl  o g ith ou  so iet  … Why does a violent 
gang culture exist in so many of our towns and cities? (Hansard, HC debs, 11 August 
2011, col. 1131) 
 
In this way, the , o e ele e t i  the p o le  st ea  was identified and given a degree of 
cross-pa t  a ki g. Al ost i ediatel  o e solutio  to the p o le  ega  to e touted 
as the press began to report that someone likely to make a significant contribution to the 
PM s ga g s i ui  as U“ supe op , Bill B atto . The media-savvy Bratton subsequently 
appeared in the conservative press in the UK offering his thoughts on gang crime and other 
subjects. Whilst the identification of the problem of gangs seemingly had considerable 
political buy-in at this stage, there was less consensus around the promotion of Bratton. 
Indeed, his potential involvement was given particularly short shrift by the police. Sir Hugh 
Orde, then President of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), questioned the 
relevance of looking to America for solutions and said that he had advised the Home 
Secretary that looking at Europe might be more appropriate but, even then, she would 
p o a l  fi d that the B itish odel as p o a l  the top .11 Whether it was to involve 
Bratton or not, it seemed clear that gangs were likely to remain on the post-riots policy 
agenda.  
 
More poli e a d ore ro ust policing  
It is fair to say that many senior police officers were unhappy at the amount of publicity 
ei g gi e  to Bill B atto s pote tial ole as a ga g ad ise  to go e e t. They were also 
decidedly unimpressed with leaked suggestions that Bratton might be in contention for the 
vacant Commissionership of the Metropolitan Police. Both the Commissioner, Paul 
Stephenson and Assistant Commissioner, John Yates, had resigned in July in connection with 
the phone-hacking scandal, leading to the temporary appointment of Tim Godwin as Acting 
Commissioner, the man in charge at the time of the riots. Indeed, a series of events in the 
two years prior to the riots including the death of Ian Tomlinson during protests at the G20 
in 2009, the police reaction to the student demonstrations in 2010, as well as the phone-
hacking scandal, had all contributed to considerable criticism of the police (Greer and 
McLaughlin, 2012). In a shift from the stance of its predecessors, the incoming Coalition 
government, or at least its Conservative Party element, took a particularly critical view of the 
police (Reiner, 2016). The leaki g of the PM s appa e t ad i atio  fo  B atto  as a fu the  
indicator of this new governmental scepticism.  
 
The political reaction to the policing of the riots was also highly critical. On 9th August, on 
what would prove to be the last day of significant rioting, breaking with the standard 
straightforwardly supportive stance generally adopted by politicians toward the police under 
such circumstances (xxx, 2015), the Prime Minister made a public statement which, though 
                                                 
11 Quoted in http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14519187 (accessed 4 Mar. 17) 
it began with praise for the bravery of police officers, quickly shifted. What was clear, he 
said, was that e eed e e  o e o ust poli e a tio … The Met opolita  Poli e 
Commissioner has said that, compared with the 6,000 police on the streets last night in 
London, there will be some 16,000 officers tonight. All leave within the Metropolitan Police 
has been cancelled. There will be aid coming from police forces up and down the country 
and we will do everything necessary to strengthen and assist those police forces that are 
eeti g this diso de . 12 The P i e Mi iste s state e t as idel  i te p eted as 
suggesting that he was less than content with police action to that point, and as implying 
that it was only through his intervention – through this role as chair of the COBRA 
emergency committee – that decisions had been taken to institute a significant shift in 
police numbers and tactics. In a speech to the House of Commons two days later, the Prime 
Minister reiterated elements of his earlier statement, saying: … what became increasingly 
clear earlier this week was that there were simply far too few police deployed on to our 
st eets, a d the ta ti s that the  e e usi g e e ot o ki g… To espo d to this situatio , 
e a e a ti g de isi el  to esto e o de  o  ou  st eets…  Follo i g the eeti gs of Co a 
that I chaired on Tuesday and Wednesday, and again this morning, we have taken decisive 
a tio  to help e su e o e o ust a d o e effe ti e poli i g.  Despite acknowledging the 
role of the Acting Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in this reorientation of tactics, 
newspaper reports clearly indicated that the police service continued to feel they were 
being publicly criticised.13  
 
Once again it was Sir Hugh Orde who was most prominent in defending the police service. In 
an interview on television he countered the suggestion that political leaders had been 
forced on their return from holiday to assume a leadership role in shaping the police 
espo se to the iots. He des i ed thei  etu  as a  i ele a e i  te s of the ta ti s that 
e e  the  de elopi g , a d a gued that the o e o ust poli i g ta ti s ou sa  were 
not a function of political interference; they were a function of the numbers being available 
to allo  the hief o sta les to ha ge thei  ta ti s. 14 The Acting Commissioner, Tim 
Godwin, also entered the fray, and picking up on the absence of some politicians in the early 
days of the rioting, he said, "I think after any event like this, people will always make 
comments who weren't there." He then went to stress that all the major decisions had been 
taken by police commanders not politicians and, furthermore, that they were:  
 
… so e of the est o a de s that e ha e see  i  the o ld... that sho ed 
g eat est ai t as ell as g eat ou age … As a esult of that, e e e a le to ip this 
in the bud after a few days. I think the issue around the numbers, the issue around 
                                                 
12 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8691034/London-riots-Prime-Ministers-
statement-in-full.html (accessed 16/10/13)  
13 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8697334/UK-riots-Sir-Hugh-Orde-says-
politicians-were-irrelevance-in-quelling-violence.html (accessed 7 September 2017) 
14 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8697334/UK-riots-Sir-Hugh-Orde-says-
politicians-were-irrelevance-in-quelling-violence.html (accessed 4 March 2017)  
the tactics - they are all police decisions and they are all made by my police 
commanders and myself.15 
 
I  espo se to O de s, the Co u ities “e eta  said, I e e  had a  dou t ho as i  
charge of that meeting and that was the Prime Minister."16 No doubt aware that speaking 
out was unlikely to help his application for the Commissionership, Orde nevertheless 
continued his high profile defence of the service, writing in The Times that it had been 
disappoi ti g to see a ou ti g atta k o  B itish poli i g .17 Attacks on Orde in the 
conservative press mounted, with some reports suggesting that it was his opposition to the 
go e e t s desi e to efo  poli i g that la  ehi d u h of the iti is . O e sou e 
suggested that O de as the chief spokesman for the way things have been, and the 
go e e t a ts to shake thi gs up  uoted i  G ee  a d M Laughli , . By this 
stage, the ea tio  to August s e e ts had e e ted the idea that the extent of the rioting 
was in part a consequence of the deployment of too few officers and the adoption of tactics 
that were insufficiently robust. More generally, the picture presented was of a somewhat 
ineffective police service, greatly in need of reform. 
 
 
4. The Policy Response 
In the initial parliamentary debate convened to discuss the riots, the Leader of the 
Opposition called on the Prime Minister to institute a full independent commission of 
inquiry. Cameron refused, saying that the current parliamentary scrutiny together with 
inquiries being undertaken by the police should be sufficient. When pressed later in the 
debate by former Home Office minister Alun Michael his response was more forceful, and in 
his refusal to appoint a Scarman-style inquiry, the Prime Minister returned to the 
criminality  narrative that had been so prominent in government speeches thus far, saying: 
This was not political protest, or a riot about protest or politics—it was common or garden 
thieving, robbing and looting, and we do not need an inquiry to tell us that.18 In the event, 
and some weeks later, an inquiry was established, albeit one announced with relatively little 
fanfare and with little status or obvious powers. The inquiry, the Riots, Communities and 
Victims Panel (RCVP), was one of the few, obvious consequences of coalition government, a 
very reluctant Conservative Prime Minister eventually having been persuaded by a 
combination of his Liberal Democrat Deputy and the Labour leader of the Opposition.  
 
The RCVP published an interim report in November 2011 (RCVP, 2011) and its final report in 
March 2012 (RCVP, 2012). Neither garnered much publicity and the governmental reaction 
was predictably muted. Indeed, it was not until July 2012 that a written ministerial 
statement offered any response from government. Even then the bulk of the statement was 
taken up with observations about riots damages and financial compensation for those 
                                                 
15 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8697334/UK-riots-Sir-Hugh-Orde-says-
politicians-were-irrelevance-in-quelling-violence.html (accessed 4 March 2017)  
16 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8697334/UK-riots-Sir-Hugh-Orde-says-
politicians-were-irrelevance-in-quelling-violence.html (accessed 4 March 2017) 
17 The Times, 18th August 2011 
18 Hansard, 11th August 2011, at col. 1075 
affected by the riots and with police reform. Only late in the statement, under the heading 
so ial poli  review , was the core of the RCVP s epo t addressed. There, all it had to say 
as that it as etai i g so e “u e “ta t Child e s Ce t es, as o ti ui g ith the 
Troubled Families and Tackling Gang Crime and Youth Violence initiatives together with a 
programme to overhaul vocational education. The remainder of the statement focused on 
toughening criminal justice and penal policies. O e agai  eite ati g the go e e t s 
primary post-riots narrative the itte  state e t o luded, But there is one clear 
overriding message: the rioters were criminals. Such opportunistic criminality was not and 
will not be tolerated.  (Written ministerial statement, Friday 13 July 2012, Hansard, cols 74-
78WS)  
 
The go e e t s formal response to the RVCP did t o e for another year (DCLG, 2013) 
and when eventually published it failed to address the vast majority of recommendations 
made by the panel. Of the 63 recommendations, at least 39 were not mentioned in the 
government reply. Co e ed a out the se se of hopeless ess  a ti ulated  a  ou g 
people, the RVCP had ade eight e o e datio s elati g to i p o i g pe so al 
esilie e . O l  o e, fo usi g o  the eed fo  lo al autho ities to e ie  p o isio , as 
included in the government response to the inquiry. Linked with the sense of limited life 
chances that so many of the young people expressed to the Panel, the final report contained 
si tee  e o e datio s elati g to hat it efe ed to as hopes a d d ea s . These 
covered such varied matters as the publication of data on literacy levels and exclusions, 
including specific data on pupils with special educational needs, the involvement of business 
in an ambassadorial role in improving school to work opportunities, and the introduction of 
a outh jo  p o ise  fo  a  ou g pe so  u e plo ed for a year or more. Although the 
go e e t s fo al espo se talked i  ge e al te s a out a u e  of p og a es it 
had in place to support young people and tackle youth unemployment, there was no direct 
espo se to a  of the ‘VCP s e o endations on this subject. Indeed, local Tottenham 
MP, David Lammy, said:   
 
The government made a very clear commitment to the riot communities that they 
would do everything they could to prevent the riots ever taking place again. 
Eighteen months later on, and one year afte  the pu li atio  of the go e e t s 
o  iots epo t, the i petus fo  efo  has o pletel  e apo ated… We o  head 
into the summer months with none of the fundamentals changed since the riots of 
August 2011. (quoted in Dodd, 2013) 
 
What the slightness of the go e e t s espo se to the ‘CVP s epo ts made illustrated 
was that there was neither any desire nor any likelihood of any concerted public policy 
response to the riots. The diagnosis was that the disorder was an aberration, and something 
that should be understood first and foremost as little more than wanton criminality. That 
this remained the dominant explanatory narrative enabled government to avoid any 
requirement to respond via broader prognostic policy development. What then of the three 
problem frames that emerged around the period of the riots? To what extent did the issues 




The Co se ati e Pa t s  ele tio  a ifesto promised a variety of reforms to policing. 
These i luded edu i g ed tape , publishing localised police recorded crime data, and 
epla i g the existing, invisible and unaccountable police authorities and [making] the 
police accountable to a directly-elected individual who will set policing priorities for local 
o u ities  (Conservative Party, 2010). All these initiatives were subsequently pursued in 
government, with the headline reform – the introduction of Police and Crime 
Commissioners – being set in train long before the 2011 riots (xxx, 2012). Nevertheless, the 
handling of the riots did lead to considerable further scrutiny of policing, and of public order 
policing more particularly. Individual forces, and the Metropolitan Police in particular, 
condu ted i ui ies. Outside i ui ies e e also o du ted  He  Majest s I spe to ate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) and the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee. The 
Met opolita  Poli e s i itial espo se to the diso de , pu lished ithi  t o o ths, 
identified a number of areas in which reform was required, not least in relation to critical 
incident management, mobilization and mutual aid and tactics. In relation to the latter it 
acknowledged the criticism from some quarters of relative police inaction during the 
disorder, but defended both the number of arrests made and the degree of intervention. It 
a k o ledged, ho e e , that the e as a eed to e plo e alte ati e ta ti s to deal ith 
diso de  o  su h a idesp ead a d fast o i g s ale  Met opolita  Police, 2011).  In its final 
report (Metropolitan Police, 2012) it oted that go fo a d ta ti s  – in which officers would 
advance on foot or in vehicles to disperse crowds - had been re-introduced and that the 
fo e as looki g at optio s to e ha e its ability to make multiple arrests without 
e o i g offi e s f o  the st eets fo  lo g pe iods  : . 
 
The Home Affairs Committee inquiry, conducted in the immediate aftermath of the riots, 
covered similar territory. It found little evidence to suggest that police powers needed to be 
expanded, but it did take the view that an earlier and more substantial increase in police 
u e s ight ha e ea t that so e of the distu a es ould ha e ee  a oided  : 
19). As to equipment, they took the view that i  the situatio  the  p e aili g, it ould ha e 
been inappropriate as well as dangerous, to have employed water cannon and baton 
ou ds  : . By far the most critical analysis, however, came from HMIC. Following 
the riots, the Home Secretary wrote to the chief inspector of constabulary noting that it was 
ital to e su e the pu li  o de  poli i g espo se is as effe ti e as it a  e . “he e t o  to 
request that further work be conducted: 
 
to support clearer guidance to forces on the size of deployments, the need for 
mutual aid, pre-emptive action, public order tactics, the number of officers 
(including commanders) trained in public order policing and an appropriate arrests 
policy.19 
 
                                                 
19 https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/public-order-policing-review/ (accessed 
12 March 2017) 
The e ie , she a ti ipated, ight he ald pote tiall  a e  e a of pu li  o de  poli i g  
(quoted in Home Affairs Committee (2011). In its report, HMIC (2011b) proposed a new 
national framework for public order policing and, more critically, suggested that some of the 
more forceful policing tactics that might reasonably have been used during the disorder, had 
been unavailable. To the surprise of some, the report drew attention to the fact that no 
force in England and Wales had water cannon, and that there were a number of forces that 
had not trained officers in the use of baton rounds. It suggested that there needed to be a 
full public debate about the use of such tactics and o luded that the approach to 
restoring order needs to change to enable a speedier self-assured response where the 
threat to the public demands it. 20 In taking such a step it relied in part on an opinion poll it 
had commissioned which suggested that almost two-thirds of the public felt there had been 
too few officers at the riot scenes initially and that almost half felt that too little force had 
been used to deal with the events (HMIC, 2011a). Just two years earlier HMIC had published 
a report on public order policing that was very different in tone. Entitled Adapting to Protest 
(HMIC, 2009), it placed emphasis on the minimum use of force, the importance of strategic 
communication with those involved in protests, and clear lines of accountability and systems 
of governance for public order policing. There was much in both the political reaction to the 
riots, and indeed the main policy responses, that seemed to sit somewhat uncomfortably 
with the strategic position that HMIC had taken in 2009. Indeed, the political diagnosis 
appeared set to drive public order policing generally in a more robust, interventionist 
direction.  
 
Where the bulk of the post-riot observations made about public order policing had tended 
to chime with much of the political criticism made at the time of the disorder, there was one 
reform proposal that, despite its clear links with problems identified by a number of riots-
related inquiries (RCVP, 2011; Guardian/LSE, 2011) was largely unexpected. In a speech at 
the LSE in December 2011 the Home Secretary offered a series of fairly standard 
observations about the riots. She denied that the iots e e a out p otest: The riots were 
not about the future, about tomorrow. They were about today. They were about now. They 
e e a out i sta t g atifi atio .21 In response to research that suggested that many rioters 
had highly antagonistic relationships with the police and were angered by the way in which 
the police used stop and search powers (Guardian/LSE, 2011), the Home Secretary defended 
their use ut said that she st o gl  elie e[d] that stop a d sea h should e used 
proportionately, without prejudice, and with the support of local co u ities … a d I ha e 
asked the Asso iatio  of Chief Poli e Offi e s to look at est p a ti e o  stop a d sea h .22 
The Association published a press release the following day. A series of reviews by HMIC 
(2013, 2015) subsequently found wide variation in fo es  u de sta di gs of ho  the 
powers should be used, and evidence of many cases in which there was insufficient 
justification for the lawful use of stop and search. In the interim, the Metropolitan Police 
                                                 
20 https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/news/releases/0262011-august-disorders/ 
(accessed 13th March 2017) 
21 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/14/theresa-may-stop-search-review (accessed 13th 
March 2017) 
22 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/14/theresa-may-stop-search-review (accessed 4 
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announced a series of changes intended to ensure that such powers were used in a more 
i tellige e-led  a  a d, o e pa ti ula l , the Co issio e  as epo ted as a ti ipati g 
a cut by about half in the use of s.60 searches (House of Commons, 2014). More generally, 
all forces subsequently signed up to the Best Use of “top a d “ea h  s he e lau hed by 
the College of Policing and HMIC in 2014. In 2015 HMIC found only 11 forces to be fully 
complying with the scheme, a further 19 forces to be failing to comply with one or two 
features of the scheme, a d  fo es faili g o  th ee o  o e of the s he e s fi e ke  
criteria. These latter forces were subsequently suspended from the scheme by the Home 
Secretary.  
 
Thus, what was arguably the most far-reaching reform within policing that was directly 
linked to the riots was not one that was highlighted in any of the political speeches at the 
time, or obviously anticipated in any other way. Indeed, the origins of the then Home 
“e eta s o e s i  this a ea remain somewhat obscure, for her stance towards the 
research that most obviously linked the riots with the issue of stop and search was 
otherwise almost entirely hostile.23 Be o d the stop a d sea h efo s the go e e t s 
critical post-riots policing narrative, highlighting what were alleged to be police failings, led 
to a period of extended analysis and self-reflection within the police service, and to a series 
of reviews of public order tactics and what appears to have been the acceptance that a 
robust response – certainly in terms of numbers and quite possibly in terms of tactics – 




The Prime Minister had argued that families and parenting were where the government 
eeded to sta t  i  its espo se to the riots. In a speech a week after the riots he 
acknowledged that the go e e t ished to put o ket ooste s  u de  a p og a e of 
work that would focus on so- alled t ou led fa ilies . Its a te ede ts la  i  a voluntary 
programme established in 2010, usi g olu tee s to adopt  e e  o ked  families to help 
them to find work. The T ou led Fa ilies I itiati e , a fo alized, e pa ded a d e o ked 
version of this earlier enterprise, was formally announced in December 2011, four months 
after the riots. In October Louise Casey had been announced as the head of the newly 
established Troubled Families Unit in the Department of Communities and Local 
Government, and in a speech to announce these developments the Secretary of State, Sir 
Eric Pickles, said that the August iots had offe ed a sudde , u el o e i sight i to ou  
p o le  fa ilies . I  the fo al lau h of the £  illio  oss-departmental initiative in 
December, the Prime Minister returned to the theme: 
 
And this summer we saw, beyond doubt, that something has gone profoundly 
wrong. The riots were a wake-up call - not a freak incident but a boiling over of 
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report-summer-riots.html (accessed 13th March 2017) 
p o le s that had ee  si e i g fo  ea s … As I said after the riots, I have a duty 
to speak clearly, frankly and truthfully about the problems in our society.24 
 
Though ot e ti el  e , the T ou led Fa ilies i itiati e e e theless a gua l  
represented the most significant and sizeable policy announcement made by government 
with any explicit link to the riots. Even at this very early stage, however, it was far from 
entirely clear what the links were between the riots and the programme. Indeed, quite 
quickly it would become rare for the riots to be mentioned when the Troubled Families 
Programme was being discussed. One of the last occasions was in the go e e t s 
response to report of the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel.  In its official response the 
go e e t eite ated the i po ta e of the p og a e, oted that good p og ess  had 
already been made in delivering it, with £448m already allocated in funding. That local 
authorities were already committed to start working with nearly 42,000 families, over one 
thi d of the a ti ipated total, as e ide e that the p og a e is o  t a k . Indeed, later 
that month a huge expansion of the Troubled Families Initiative was announced by 
government. I  that ea s spe di g ou d a fu the  £  was allocated to enable the 
initiative to be expanded to reach an additional 400,000 families over the next five years. 
The fact that this equated to over six percent of all families in England meant, as one 
commentator (Crossley, 2015) put it: 
 
… the su sta tial dis etio  offe ed to lo al autho ities i  i te p eti g a d appl i g 
the criteria, means that almost any family who comes into contact with, or is 
referred to, a non-u i e sal se i e ould fall i to the atego  of t ou led . 
 
Local authorities began to sign up for the new extended programme in 2014 and it got 
underway fully in 2015, operating with much more inclusionary criteria than had originally 
been in operation when first launched. In addition, there were also considerable changes to 
the key success criteria - that is hat as ea t  the ph ase fo  fa ilies to e tu ed 
a ou d . By 2015 government figures were suggesting that close to 120,000 families had 
been turned around, with the vast majority of local authorities reporting success rates of 
well over 90% and in some cases 100%. In the main, the vast majority of successes 
concerned some improvement in relation to crime/antisocial behaviour or education, rather 
than to the aim of continuous employment (DCLG, 2015). It was a further year before the 
initial reports of the independent evaluation that had been commissioned were published, 
and only then after the BBC had claimed that they were being suppressed.25 The report 
fou d a la k of e ide e of a  s ste ati  o  sig ifi a t i pa t … o  the p i a  out o e 
easu es fo  the p og a e  (Day et al, 2016: 81).  
 
In its report on the delay to the publication of the Troubled Families evaluation, the BBC 
des i ed the p og a e as the go e e t s flagship poli  espo se to the iots .26 In 
fact, this description is rather hard to sustain for although the formal initiative was launched 
in the aftermath of the riots, and was clearly linked by Ministers to the disorder, it was 
                                                 
24 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/troubled-families-speech (accessed 10th March 2017) 
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based on policy formulations that had been in development long before the riots occurred. 
That the linking of the initiative to the riots was at least partly opportunistic was later 
indicated by the quiet dropping of all reference to the disorder. Within a year government 
had ceased suggesting there was any link between the programme and the riots. There is 
not a single reference to the riots in the final evaluation documents, not even in the sections 
dealing with the history of the initiative. In fact, even at the launch of the programme in 
2011 the link with the riots appeared somewhat circumstantial. In its initial form there was 
no explicit connection made between the public policy issues identified as a consequence of 
the riots a d the defi itio  of t ou led fa ilies  that u de pi ed the i itiati e. Any links 
that may have existed became all the more tenuous as the programme target was expanded 
from 120,000 to 400,000 families. Indeed, by the time of the initial expansion of the 
initiative, and long before the publication of any evaluative material, any mention of the 
riots had long since disappeared.  
 
The p og a e s roots lay in other developments and, i  the te s utilised i  Ki gdo s 
(1995) MSA model, the riots represented the opening of a policy window as a consequence 
of de elop e ts i  the p o le  st ea . The riots were a convenient opportunity to justify 
and sell the initiative, whilst simultaneously enabling government to appear to be 
responding directly to the disorder. The identification of a range of problems – defined in 
particular ways in the aftermath of the riots by those seeking to set a particular agenda – 
then enabled specific solutions to be attached to them. In this case, it was the identification 
of a series of problem behaviours and moral failures on the part of a section of the youthful 
populatio , oth li ked to the go e e t s o e  ith oke  B itai , that offered the 
opportunity to establish and promote the Troubled Families initiative. Once established and 
funded all reference to the riots was quietly and quickly dropped.  
 
The gang problem 
Of all the things focused upon by senior political figures during and in the immediate 
aftermath of the riots, the one on which they appeared most obviously to agree was gangs. 
Despite the regular and robust political suggestions that gangs had played a significant role 
in the riots, the statistics published in the months afterward began to cast serious doubt on 
such claims. Government data found 13% of riot a estees to e affiliated  to a ga g a d the 
Ho e Offi e statisti al o e ie  epo ted that ost poli e fo es pe ei ed that he e 
ga g e e s e e i ol ed, the  ge e all  did ot pla  a pi otal ole  Ho e Offi e, 
2011a). Nevertheless, having indicated early on that this was to be a priority, the 
government seemed to be committed to moving policy forward in this field. They held an 
expert seminar in October 2011 attended by Bill Bratton and others from the US, Jamaica, 
Germany and Spain amongst other places and in November it published its new Ending Gang 
and Youth Violence st ateg . I  the fo e o d, the Ho e “e eta  oted that: One thing 
that the riots in August did do was to bring home to the entire country just how serious a 
problem gang and outh iole e has o  e o e  (Home Office, 2011b). 
 
The p o le  of ga g  iole e as o e that had ee  lu ki g a ou d the edges of 
governmental agendas for some time. The defi itio  of ga g  utilised i  the st ateg  as 
the one that had been used by the right-leaning think tank, the Centre for Social Justice 
(CSJ), in its report on the subject a couple of years earlier (CSJ, 2009). Indeed, the strategy 
included a foreword by the former leader of the Conservative Party and Chairman of the CSJ, 
Iain Duncan Smith, as well as by the Home Secretary. The post-riots strategy included 
commitments to establish an Ending Gang and Youth Violence Team that would work with a 
virtual network of over 100 expert advisers to provide practical advice and support to local 
areas with a gang or serious youth violence problem. It said that it would extend police and 
local authority powers to take out gang injunctions to cover teenagers aged 14 to 17 
(introduced by the Policing and Crime Act 2009, gang injunctions are taken out against 
individuals involved in gang-related violence and can place a range of prohibitions and 
requirements on their behaviour and activities) and it promised £10m Home Office funding 
for up to 30 areas with the biggest serious youth violence and gang problems to improve the 
ways mainstream services worked with young people most at risk of becoming involved with 
serious violence. Government activity in this area was supplemented by work by the Centre 
for Social Justice (CSJ). In its report on tackling gangs one year after the riots (CSJ, 2012) it 
o e ded the go e e t s st ateg , ut a gued fo  g eate  atte tio  to e paid to ea l  
intervention and to work to improve relations between young people and the police. 
Despite the go e e t s o it e ts to investment and reform, the CSJ concluded that 
ea l  a ea  o  … the e is a da ge  that the e thusias  fo  ha ge de eloped afte  the 
iots is ei g allo ed to go old . Annual in-house e ie s of the go e e t s st ateg  
claimed a number of successes for the investments that were made in local areas, but this 
fell well short of what the Home Affairs Select Committee felt might be considered an 
effective evaluation (HASC, 2015).  
 
Once again, this was an area of policy development that, in some respects, only had the 
most marginal of links to the riots. There were few people connected with the riots – 
beyond senior government spokespeople – who made much of the links between gangs, or 
in the case of the local Tottenham MP David Lammy, gang culture, and the riots. Both the 
Prime Minister and the Home Secretary made much of the role of gangs and it was the 
Prime Minister who set the Home Office review in train. From this point on, however, 
beyond the most fleeting of references to the riots, there was no attempt to link gang policy 
to the specific circumstances of, or problems raised by, the riots.  
 
5. Concluding thoughts 
Our aim in this paper has ee  to appl  ele e ts of Ki gdo s  ultiple st ea s 
app oa h  to the a al sis of the go e e tal esponse to the 2011 riots in the belief that it 
is a profitable tool for helping make sense of the shape of policy development at the time 
and since. Indeed, an analysis of the riots in this regard leads to a number of observations. 
First, and most straightfor a dl , the iots e e a  ope  poli  i do . That is to sa , the  
offe ed a  oppo tu it  fo  ad o ates to push thei  pet solutio s o  to push atte tio  to 
thei  spe ial p o le s  Ki gdo , : . Events in either the problem or political 
streams can lead to the opening of windows, and the riots most obviously fall into the 
former. Although there was no obvious change in the political stream at the time, the riots 
occurred at what was still a relatively early and still unpredictable time for the coalition 
government. As such, arguably, it offered an opportunity for e t ep e eu s  ithi  
government to use their capital to push favoured policy solutions. In practice, however, it is 
not possible to identify more than a handful of policy initiatives that could be claimed to 
have any link with the riots, and in the bulk of those cases the links are tenuous at best.  
 
This leads to a second observation: much of the political activity and many of the political 
statements issued during and in the immediate aftermath of the riots might reasonably be 
portrayed as attempts to close the policy window. They were, in effect, attempts to shut 
down discussion both of existing government policy and to deny the need for further 
contemplation or for further action outside a narrowly circumscribed agenda. Not least, the 
major statements issued by senior government figures all sought to undercut any possibility 
that go e e t poli  itself ight e alled i to uestio . A o it e t to auste it  
meant that there was little fiscal room for manoeuvre, and a coalition government struggling 
to combine two election manifestos also had little room for new policy initiatives, even if it 
had had any desire. To the extent that significant policy developments can be identified in 
the aftermath of earlier major episodes of disorder, these have in large part been a 
consequence of major public or judicial inquiries. In this regard, the Scarman Inquiry 
(Scarman, 1981) carried out in the aftermath of the 1981 Brixton riot is the exemplar. In 
2011 the Prime Minister was clear in his view that an inquiry was unnecessary, and the 
subsequent Riots, Communities and Victims Inquiry, agreed to only reluctantly, had few of 
the trappings of a major official inquiry and reported long after any policy window – such as 
it was – had been firmly shut.  
 
Those policy developments that did emerge, and that were argued to have some link with 
the riots, are neat illustrations of Ki gdo s suggestion that ad o a  of solutio s ofte  
precedes the highlighti g of p o le s to hi h the  e o e atta hed  (1995: 205-6). In the 
case of ga gs a d t ou led fa ilies , many of the ideas or proposals had been floating 
a ou d i  the poli  p i e al soup  fo  so e ti e. In these cases, rather than being simply 
a case of solutions becoming tied to problems rather than vice versa, senior figures made 
careful use of the riots to draw attention to already-identified problems, using the disorder 
as a rationale for an increased or renewed focus on the problem. Thus, as the Home 
Secretary said of the riots, one thing they did was bring home to the entire country just how 
se ious a p o le  ga g a d outh iole e has o  e o e . In a similar vein, the 
Communities Minister said that the August iots had offe ed a sudde , u elcome insight 
into our problem families . The a ou e e t of the t ou led fa ilies i itiati e  as an 
illustration that this sudde , u el o e i sight  was at least as much a sudden, welcome 
policy window. The primary governmental response was to use the riots to rationalise and 
promote its existing preferences. Indeed, even in the case of the Ho e “e eta s 
announcement of the reform of police stop and search practices it is perfectly possible that 
it was largely an opportunistic policy development, usi g a i do  offe ed  a high 
profile public speech, to put a personal priority onto the political agenda.   
 
Ki gdo s M“A odel, i  ou  ie , offe s a  e o ousl  useful heu isti  fo  u de sta di g 
and analysing policy-making and, more particularly, the ways in which agendas are 
established and courses of action chosen. In this particular case, rather than using his model 
as the basis for understanding policy development, we have used it as a means for analysing 
the framing of problems, and have argued that such frames then become, or are used, as 
constraints on and rationalisations of policy development. Policy-making, as is well-
established in the literature, generally falls far short of some rational choice-influenced 
model (Hood, 1983), and yet it is far from irrational. It is structured and has patterns and 
regularities. We are used to thinking of violent public disorder as something posing 
significant challenges to the police and other public services. We are less used to thinking of 
them as the types of sudden rupture that ope  p o le  i do s , offering the potential for 
insight into governmental agenda-setting and alternative selection.   
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